In the dénouement of George Eliot’s great novel The Mill on the Floss (1860), the heroine, Maggie Tulliver, is taken on a rowing excursion on the (fictional) river Floss by Stephen Guest, a young man engaged to Maggie’s cousin and dear friend, Lucy Deane. Unhappily, despite that engagement, Maggie and Stephen have fallen in love.
Stephen, who manning the oars, lets the boat drift past the town of Luckreth, where they would ordinarily alight and head home by land. The boat is carried down the great river, and there is no point past Luckreth where they can come ashore early enough to get home the same day. Stephen, who is striving to be entirely honourable, proposes to Maggie and suggests that they elope, but Maggie refuses, out of loyalty to Lucy.
The upshot of all this is that Maggie does not return home for several days, by which time it is known that she has been away overnight with Stephen. This is enough to ruin her reputation. That she has not slept with Stephen is little help: in the eyes of most of her family and friends, it suffices that she has publicly put herself in a situation where she could have done so. Maggie now faces ostracism or exile from her little world, but George Eliot releases her. The river Floss floods, and Maggie drowns while attempting to save her beloved brother, Tom Tulliver, who had been particularly quick and bitter in condemning his sister.
George Eliot’s melodrama only makes sense under the old moral norms.
This melodrama—profoundly moving in Eliot’s telling—only makes sense under the old moral norms which demanded that a respectable woman would not sleep with a man who was not her husband. Such norms have been usual throughout most of history, in the West and beyond, and what we mean by the “sexual revolution” and “women’s liberation” is, inter alia, their erosion or abolition.
Of course, when those norms subsisted, women still did sleep with men to whom they were not married. The seriousness of the consequences that they endured for doing so varied greatly: those consequences were particularly grave in nineteenth-century England, which is why their threat is a powerful force in many of the great English novels. Other societies were far more forgiving or cynical, but such forms of flexibility towards the norms were profoundly different from the project of abolishing them.
A woman’s “virtue” or “character” had to be protected, and society was arranged accordingly.
The social and legal condemnation of rape is, in the first instance, a survival from that earlier moral system. Rape was vile because it forced a woman to do what she could not do freely without dishonoring herself and her family. Within this framework, rape was relatively easy to police. A woman’s “virtue” or “character” had to be protected, and society was arranged accordingly, particularly by setting limits to when and where men and women could be alone together. A rape accusation became prima facie plausible if a man had transgressed those limits. That still left the question of the woman’s consent, but a woman could refer precisely to her “character”, to her reputation, as evidence that she had not consented to the encounter.
As Maggie Tulliver’s story is meant to illustrate, this moral system imposed heavy burdens upon women. Their good character could easily be forfeited, and, once this had happened, they could also lose much or all of their protection against male depredation. This was cruel in itself, and all the more so because men never faced consequences of the same order. If Stephen Guest had seduced and abandoned Maggie, he would have been considered a bad sort of man by many of those around him, and could possibly have undergone violence from Maggie’s male relatives. But he would not have been “ruined” in the sense Maggie was: he could still have married respectably and maintained his social position.
George Eliot, who herself was partly ostracized for cohabiting with another woman’s husband, portrayed such injustices with great poignancy. Still, her overall perspective on the moral system at work is far more complex than a simple condemnation. It was in succeeding generations that its injustices came to seem intolerable, just as the pill was conveniently making the norms that underpinned them seem unnecessary.
Fast-forward to today—to the matter of Russell Brand—and we have reached the opposite extreme. A woman accepts the advances of a famous man who has aggressively cultivated a public reputation for unbridled debauchery. She engages in several sequences of lewd acts with him, first backstage, and then at his own house, where she has come at his invitation. Years later, she tells the authorities, without hiding any of the above, that she did not consent to one of those acts. In due course, this account is sufficient for the man to be jailed as a rapist.
All that is left, for determining the truth of an accusation, is the plausibility of the rival accounts of the man and woman.
With such a scenario, the elements that made a rape accusation credible under the old regime have clearly become entirely irrelevant. Indeed the woman is narrating, as part of her accusation of rape, just such elements as would once have been raised against her in order to make the accusation untenable: her own choices to cavort with the man, including in his own home. Add to this the newly normative claim that no particular pattern of reactions may be expected of a rape victim after the event, and all that is left, for determining the truth of an accusation, is the plausibility of the rival accounts of the man and woman of what happened at the very moment of the alleged crime.
One may believe that Brand’s accuser was entirely truthful, and then find what Brand did to her reprehensible, and still acknowledge that this is a disastrous state of affairs. If juries and judges are urged to consider all circumstantial evidence as irrelevant, and to throw out all normative sexual expectations except that of consent at the moment of action, then they must in effect adjudicate in isolation contradicting versions of what happened in the privacy of a bedroom. Only a mind-reader could trust himself to judge fairly under these conditions.
By the same token, almost all limits on the circumstances where an accusation of rape might be prosecuted are eliminated. If a woman can show she was with a man in a situation where he could have raped her, that alone is, in theory, enough for a case to go forward. How she ended up in that situation, and the nature of her previous relations with the man, do not matter. To be sure, most women will not wish to abuse this power, and if enough did, the new model would swiftly implode. But the vast new potential for rape accusations cannot but create profound unease in the relations between the sexes. At the same time, it gives media and authorities a frighteningly wide field for making a rape accusation stick against anyone whom they disfavour. This is why, as Café Américan editor Elena Louisa Lange has argued, one cannot reasonably separate the media attacks on Brand’s dealings with women, and his subsequent trial and conviction, from the fall from public grace which he had brought about by his political pivots.
Some may respond that, while the new arrangement does indeed put men under crushing pressures, this is only fair after all the centuries where women had to endure the fate of Maggie Tulliver, while the men who had ruined their lives paid no price worth mentioning. But that is the logic of revenge, and, as the adage has it, sooner or later, an eye for an eye will leave the whole world blind.