What can the history of the largest conflict of the twentieth century teach us about today’s worsening global situation?
One might start with two facts about the Second World War. First, the conflict quickly spread, until it engulfed every major power. Second, a very loose axis of mutually suspicious dictators—Hitler, Mussolini, Tōjō, as well as their smaller Hungarian and Romanian allies, Horthy and Antonescu—each thought it wise to gamble that despite their vastly smaller economies and populations, they could ultimately defeat the combined strength of the British Empire, China, the USSR and the United States.
Western countries today hope to deter a similarly dissonant set of dictators: China’s Xi, Russia’s Putin, North Korea’s Kim, and whoever in the IRGC is currently running Iran. Yet today’s Western alliance may, in terms of its military, economic and fiscal strength, be far less able than its World War II–era counterpart to deter gambits by our adversaries to alter the balance of power through war.
Today’s Western alliance may be far less able than its World War II–era counterpart to deter gambits by our adversaries to alter the balance of power through war.
Consider how the response to the German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 could not be contained to central Europe. Britain and France did not engage Germany alone—their global empires did as well. The USSR also invaded Poland just over two weeks after the Germans, and soon afterwards attacked Finland. From there the war widened further, drawing more countries into the conflict or subjecting them to occupation. By May 1940, Germany had attacked Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway, and the following month, Italy joined the war as a German ally.
By September 1940, the Soviets had already annexed the three Baltic states, along with a swath of Romanian territory, and on the other side of the world, Japan invaded northern French Indochina—the Japanese empire had already occupied Manchuria in 1931, which gave the Pacific front of the war its decisive impulse (the Japanese refer to the Second World War as the “Fifteen Year War”). Finally, the USSR and the US may have preferred not to go to war with Germany and Japan, respectively, but had no choice once they were attacked in June and December 1941.
The future may prove that Russia’s war in Ukraine, Hamas’s 7 October massacre in southern Israel, Israel’s subsequent wars in Gaza and with Iran’s proxy in Lebanon, the conflict between the United States and Iran, and the simmering conflict between China and its neighbors in the South China Sea were all distinct events and not harbingers of some larger war. At the same time, for most people living in the 1930s, the similar series of escalating regional conflicts—Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, foreign intervention in Spain’s civil war and a series of border clashes between Japan and the USSR that culminated in fighting at Khalkhin Gol from May to September 1939—could only be discerned years later as forming a pattern.
For the Chinese, the chronology of the conflict reaches back to Japan’s full-scale invasion in 1937 or its seizure of Manchuria in 1931. The Czechs had already lost control of the Sudetenland in late 1938, while German occupation of the remaining Czech lands began in March 1939 (that same month, Germany also seized the Lithuanian port of Klaipėda, or Memel). For Albanians, Italian occupation came three weeks later.
The future may prove that today’s many global military conflicts were all distinct events and not harbingers of some larger war. Yet for most people living in the 1930s, the similar series of escalating regional conflicts could only be discerned years later as forming a pattern.
Today, the so-called CRINKs (China, Russia, Iran and North Korea) might seem too disparate in ideology and aspiration to coordinate effectively. Yet the Axis powers never behaved as a true alliance either. Though Germany and Japan had been formally allied for nearly nine months, Germany made no effort to warn Japan in advance of its impending attack on the USSR. Nor did the Japanese apprise the Germans of their plans to attack the US. Hitler’s subsequent declaration of war against the United States came at the behest of his navy, who wanted free rein to impede US supply ships heading to the UK. Aiding his Japanese allies was not even an afterthought. Mussolini ordered the invasion of Greece without Hitler’s approval; the latter then had little choice but to intervene when the Italian army proved unequal to the task. While Japan and the US were locked in a bitter contest throughout the Pacific, Soviet ships, laden with US supplies to be used against Germany, sailed past Japan’s home islands to the port of Vladivostok until August 1945.
Today, the so-called CRINKs (China, Russia, Iran and North Korea) might seem too disparate in ideology and aspiration to coordinate effectively. Yet the Axis powers never behaved as a true alliance either.
Similarly, each of the CRINKs pursues its own interests, while cooperating for mutual gain. North Korea supplies artillery shells to Russia and sends its troops to die on the front line in Ukraine. Russia and Iran cooperate on drone technology and air defense. China buys Iranian oil and supplies Russia with dual-use components for its military.
Zbigniew Brzezinski anticipated much of this in 1997. In The Grand Chessboard, he warned of a coalition of China, Russia and perhaps Iran, held together by “complementary grievances”, with China leading and Russia following.
That means that a coordinated assault on Western interests cannot be absolutely ruled out. The most likely scenario would mirror the sequential opening of different fronts across the globe that characterized the beginning of the Second World War. China might blockade Taiwan, which would draw US military assets away from Europe, much as the recent conflict with Iran has drawn them from the Western Pacific.
An emboldened Russia might then be tempted to initiate a limited campaign against NATO, most likely in one of the Baltic states. Or Putin, determined to break NATO and force it to end its support for Ukraine, might move first, with China then seizing the opportunity to move on Taiwan. With Western forces tied down in northeastern Europe and East Asia and ammunition stocks running low, North Korea might choose to invade South Korea and Iran continue to assault Saudi Arabia and Israel.
Economic Power as Deterrence?
For anyone who thinks that the collective West can easily deter aggression thanks to its large economies alone, the comparison in Table 1 should prompt second thoughts. The table shows output and population in the Axis countries and the nations that ultimately constituted the alliance against them. Though the Axis powers were far from being formal allies in early 1939, they were already closely aligned. Hitler had already remilitarized the Rhineland and annexed Austria, Italy had conquered Ethiopia, and both Germany and Italy had intervened in the Spanish Civil War. Japan had conquered Manchuria and much of northern China, including Beijing, as well as the commercial hub of Shanghai. Yet, as the Axis powers contemplated further conflict, they would have been aware of how badly they still fared in any comparison to their potential targets, in terms of both economic output and population. This was not sufficient to deter them.
