This article was previously published in German political magazine casablanca 2.25.
“Show me in the holy books where you are permitted to murder Jews; God will never forgive you for what you have done”.— Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud to pilgrims from Hebron, following the anti-Jewish massacre of 1929
In September 2025, after Israel attempted to eliminate members of Hamas’s Political Bureau negotiating team in Doha—an operation Qatar regarded as a violation of its sovereignty—German public broadcaster ARD reported the following perspective from the Arab world: “All in all, one has to say that this attack constitutes a blatant breach of Qatar’s sovereignty, and yes, across the board, the Arab states condemn it. Egypt, for example, is calling for international pressure on Israel to be increased substantially. But the Arab states also need to look at themselves, because Jordan, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, too, have peace agreements with Israel and maintain economic relations with it”.
Today, it no longer takes Islamist terrorist groups to smear and sabotage the process of rapprochement between Arab states and Israel; journalists working for public broadcasters are only too willing to assume that role themselves. “Israel versus Arabia” is treated as a quasi-natural antagonism in the Middle East—one that is invoked with pathos and actively reinforced across the German media landscape, without any expectation of pushback. Even the decades-long, well-rehearsed insistence on “nuance” when it comes to the human rights, economic, and political conditions of the mostly underdeveloped Arab states—ostensibly to avoid painting too bleak a picture of the region—did not prompt ARD’s Cairo correspondent to ask why certain Arab states, while sharply condemning the attacks on Hamas operatives in the Qatari capital, have, unlike most European states, repeatedly participated since October 7—directly or indirectly—in intercepting rockets fired at Israel.
No commentators asked why certain Arab states have, unlike most European states, repeatedly participated since October 7—directly or indirectly—in intercepting rockets fired at Israel.
In light of recent developments in the Gaza Strip, both the journalistic and political mainstream continue to insist on a dangerous contrast between Arab and Israeli interests. In doing so, they ignore the divergent—at times outright contradictory—interests of the Arab states and absolutize the Arab–Israeli antagonism in an almost racist manner, elevating it to a primordial enmity, while disregarding developments of recent years. In particular, they evade the question of why some Arab states that publicly condemn Israel on the diplomatic stage have, since October 7, increasingly supported the country militarily and through intelligence cooperation. In many cases, this contradiction is not even recognized as such.
In this respect, Saudi Arabia stands out in particular. The kingdom has recently taken part in intercepting missiles launched against Israel from Yemen and from Iran—even though it has yet to recognize Israel as a state. And although, in recent months, Saudi Arabia has emphasized in numerous diplomatic talks with Arab and American interlocutors the importance of establishing a Palestinian state—not least in the wake of the Israeli strike in Doha, after which a gesture of solidarity was promised to the Emirate of Qatar, which had previously been kept at political arm’s length—the process of rapprochement with Israel has not been abandoned.
Saudi Arabia’s posture toward Israel is thus double-edged on the one hand, and consistent beyond daily political developments on the other. In fact, this policy of ambivalence is not merely a phenomenon of recent months. Since Saudi Arabia was founded as a modern state in 1932, it has consistently—if only relatively, in the Arab context—adopted a comparatively moderate position toward the Jewish state. This stance stems from intra-Arab and intra-Islamic rivalries, which have always posed a greater threat to the royal custodians of Islam’s two holy sites in Mecca and Medina than has the state of Israel. At the same time, an open alliance with Israel—viewed with hostility by other Arab countries—would have risked isolating the Gulf state, an outcome it was equally keen to avoid.
Although this constellation made any openly articulated partnership with the Jewish state impossible for successive rulers of the Saudi dynasty, political instruments of mutual tolerance were nonetheless employed. Secret meetings between officials were initiated, indirect channels of communication maintained, and even economic cooperation was actively pursued. In other words, every means short of formal political recognition was used to advance Saudi interests through cooperation with the Jewish state.
Saudi–Zionist Relations Before 1948
This interest-driven policy pursued by the Saudi royal house toward the Zionists dates back to the period prior to the founding of the State of Israel. The history of Saudi–Zionist (and later Saudi–Israeli) relations shows that the anti-Judaism anchored in the Qur’an did not constitute a guiding principle for the Gulf monarchy’s foreign policy. It is true that the founder of the modern Saudi state, Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud, held antisemitic views that could have made him a natural partner of National Socialism. Yet these views were subordinated to Saudi Arabia’s own geopolitical interests—above all with regard to rivalries within the Arab world.
Until 1948, Abd al-Aziz’s primary concern was less the establishment of a Jewish state in the British Mandate of Palestine than Hashemite expansion toward the Saudi kingdom and the challenge to his custodianship of Islam’s most important holy sites posed by the then Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini—a genuine admirer of Hitler. It therefore makes sense that Abd al-Aziz assumed a mediating role during the Arab Revolt (1936–1939) in British-ruled Palestine, and that this period also saw numerous diplomatic encounters between Zionists—including David Ben-Gurion—and Saudi envoys.
Abd al-Aziz assumed a mediating role during the Arab Revolt (1936–1939) in British-ruled Palestine, and this period also saw numerous diplomatic encounters between Zionists—including David Ben-Gurion—and Saudi envoys.
Although the Zionist movement not unjustly regarded Abd al-Aziz as a “medieval Islamic fanatic”, it was impossible to ignore the power-political potential of the emerging kingdom and its willingness to engage in dialogue—especially during and after the Arab Revolt. Moshe Shertok, head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, visited in 1937 a Saudi delegation in London in order to spell out Zionist objectives. It was therefore hardly surprising that, at times, the British even considered placing the Arab-populated areas of Mandatory Palestine under the control of the Saudi crown.
