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The Suicide of Aesthetics

How Art and Art Criticism Have Made Themselves Irrelevant
The Austrian artist Günter Brus self-harming for the art performance "Der helle Wahnsinn", Vienna 1968.
The Austrian artist Günter Brus self-harming for the art performance "Der helle Wahnsinn", Vienna 1968.

For many decades, high culture and the arts have been trapped in a chronic downward spiral, even if arts-page journalists, gallery owners, publishers, prize committees and concert promoters might see things differently.

Aesthetic theory is in scarcely better shape. It has suffered a dramatic loss of relevance, appeal and plausibility, and now ekes out a joyless existence as an academic shadow of its former self. Only occasionally does an original thought flicker into view. For all their differences in detail, analytic, postmodern, and post-postmodern aesthetics share one canonical conviction: they no longer lay claim to objective, scientific knowledge of art; indeed, such a claim is regarded as either hubris or naïveté.

Aesthetic discourse today is characterized by a diffuse, strangely inconsistent relativism. Blatantly counterintuitive theories circulate everywhere and have long since become mainstream. Their connection to the yellowing foundational texts of academia is both convoluted and tenuous; meanwhile, they have proliferated vigorously. Particularly tenacious is the grandiose assertion that art cannot be defined because it is radically “open-ended” (Morris Weitz).

Aesthetic discourse today is characterized by a diffuse, strangely inconsistent relativism.

Equally indestructible is its twin proposition: one can, in principle, recognize a work of art but cannot say what it is (William E. Kennick)—a formula uncomfortably reminiscent of the claim made by certain well-known German political activists that fascism is difficult to explain, but you know it when you see it.

Then there is the popular slogan that no difference in value exists between high and popular culture. Indeed the very possibility of identifying something as fundamental as aesthetic experience has been deemed necessarily suspect. In the 1960s, the art theorist and artist Donald Judd (1928–1994) spoke for many artists when he declared: “If someone calls it art, it’s art”.

Another perennial favorite, an august classic by now, is the claim that any ordinary object can be elevated to the dignity of a work of art by any ordinary artist—an aesthetic fantasy of omnipotence. The icing on this cake of accumulated nonsense is the devilishly humane postulate that everyone is an artist—an aberration for which, exceptionally, theory cannot be blamed. Incidentally, one should not imagine that today’s arts-page chatterer still maintains any direct intellectual contact with those older, now faded theories. Is gratitude even in his nature? After all, even though the founding fathers created the nebulous habitat that makes his parasitic existence possible amid the new confusion of our thoroughly nice democracy, those earlier theorists still had to grapple with classical theories of art, a task that demanded considerable intellectual effort. That effort has long since become dispensable.

The Repulsiveness of Activist Art

No wonder that, with defeatist aesthetic theories in the ascendant, the standard of art criticism has fallen dramatically. If you can say neither what a work of art nor what aesthetic experience is—if you have indeed abandoned the ambition even to try— you must capitulate when confronted with the question of how to evaluate a work of art. The end result is a retreat into the pseudo-subjectivist verbiage of the experts. Quite often, proponents of supposedly “advanced” aesthetic theories fancy themselves friends of avant-garde art, or at least of “progressive” art, and, in the worst cases, of “activist” art. In this regard, little has changed to this day.

If you can say neither what a work of art nor what aesthetic experience is, you must capitulate when confronted with the question of how to evaluate a work of art.

Although the movement of 1968, especially in its militant early phase, unleashed powerful puritanical, anti-art impulses—to be sure, a realignment soon followed—contemporary avant-garde art got along remarkably well with the New Left. Evidently, nobody was being too particular. The basis for this affinity was presumably a shared enthusiasm for the idea of permanent revolution and the messianic zeal of both movements. Strictly speaking, none of it fits together, but the contradictions are politely overlooked. The established creed is hardly compatible with the rule of an arts-page expertocracy: if objective aesthetic knowledge is impossible, there is no rational reason why the public should pay any attention to an expert’s opinion. Credo quia absurdum est.

Of course, one should not suppose that the triumph of aesthetically modest theories stems from a purely intellectual—that is, academic—wrong turn. Theory always arrives too late. The development of art in the twentieth century, with its constant innovations and restless tendency to expand and inflate the concept of art—a kind of hysterical one-upmanship—undermined every closed category. The practice of artists seemed to make a mockery of traditional definitions of art’s essence. Theory pragmatically adapted to the new reality, in the cases of analytic and postmodern aesthetics alike.

The development of art in the twentieth century, with its constant innovations and restless tendency to expand and inflate the concept of art undermined every closed category. Theory adapted in the cases of analytic and postmodern aesthetics alike.

After Abstract Expressionism, whose gestural action painting made the process of painting itself the subject, the concept of art underwent a dramatic radicalization in the 1950s. In 1951, Rauschenberg’s “White Paintings” reduced the canvas to a plain white surface. A year later, John Cage’s “4′33″” made silence and ambient noise the material of a composition. In 1953 came Rauschenberg’s “Erased de Kooning Drawing”, in which the artist erased a drawing by Willem de Kooning (1904–1997), a star of Abstract Expressionism, and declared the trace of its obliteration to be the work. That same year, Rauschenberg created “Bed”, a prototype of the so-called “Combines”: the artist covered bedding with paint, hung it on the wall as a picture, and allowed the everyday object to remain simultaneously a painting, a sculpture and a bed. In 1959, Kaprow’s “18 Happenings in 6 Parts”, the first formally staged Happening, turned space, objects and audience alike into a work of art. But the one-upmanship was far from over. In 1971, Chris Burden staged “Shoot”, a self-injuring performance in which the artist had someone fire a rifle at him.

Europe, too, had its extreme performances: during the so-called “Uni-Ferkelei” (“university obscenity”) at the University of Vienna in 1968, Viennese Actionist Günter Brus smeared himself with his own excrement and masturbated under the motto “Art and Revolution”, all while singing the Austrian national anthem. To avoid imprisonment, Brus fled to West Berlin with his wife and daughter, where he returned to drawing and painting. An amnesty followed in 1976, and twenty years later, he was awarded the Grand Austrian State Prize.

Postmodern Totalitarianism

This is only a small selection. The two decades between 1950 and 1970 saw the emergence of an almost bewildering array of radical works of widely varying quality. Theory struggled laboriously to keep pace. But that was not its only motive. As is well known, a basic impulse among younger generations of theorists is to distinguish themselves decisively from the older generation of professors through their choice of subjects and methods. This can be seen, for example, in the triumph of analytic philosophy in Germany beginning in the 1960s, or in the ascendancy of structuralism and discourse theory in the 1970s and 1980s.

In aesthetics, it manifested itself in the linguistic-analytic turn, which broke with the earlier phenomenological or intellectual-historical orientation and placed the logical structure of propositions and practices of meaning ahead of expression and lived experience. Much the same applies to continental postmodern aesthetics, which turned away from older hermeneutic and idealist approaches by replacing unity, expression and definitions of essence with difference, deconstruction, simulacra and the dissolution of fixed meaning. In a competitive society, new theoriese’ apparent self-evidence and plausibility (to their creators at least) derive to no small extent from the need to assert oneself against established approaches—and thus from explicitly non-rational motives. Not least for this reason, the question arises whether a theory independent of the social field and adequate to its object is possible: a rational, objective aesthetics beyond cultural fashions and generational needs for distinction.

Continental postmodern aesthetics replaced unity, expression and definitions of essence with difference, deconstruction, simulacra and the dissolution of fixed meaning.

Objective aesthetics? Surely, it is hardly reasonable to deny that art has essentially subjective dimensions. But this does not mean that objective aesthetics is impossible, or that we must abandon a traditional, binding approach. It does mean, however, that the subjective and objective components of aesthetics and art theory must be clearly distinguished.

To be sure, aesthetics and art criticism can never attain the status of an exact natural science such as physics or chemistry, or of a rigorous formal science such as mathematics. Nor would that be desirable. The idea of ranking works of art hierarchically according to a yardstick tends to leave art lovers feeling mildly seasick. It recalls the scene in Peter Weir’s popular Dead Poets Society in which the inspirational teacher Keating (Robin Williams) tells his students to tear out the poetry textbook’s mechanical scale of values—a sterile coordinate system for calculating poetic “greatness”.

Such alien standards of value are not merely academic: totalitarianism took them at their word and put them into practice in cultural policy. In East Germany, the literary scholar Hans Mayer defended Franz Kafka and James Joyce—whose books were scarcely available in the GDR—against the doctrine of the primacy of socialist realism, which branded the authors decadent and formalist. He was forced to flee to the West. Such external standards of value—that is, standards alien to art—are problematic even when they are not totalitarian. In a radio discussion in 1963, Adorno, by no means a naive believer in artistic progress, was pressed by his student Wilhelm Emrich into delivering, to his visible discomfort, the banal verdict that Kafka should be ranked above Thomas Mann as a literary artist simply because his literary technique was more “advanced”.

Such alien standards of value are not merely academic: totalitarianism took them at their word and put them into practice in cultural policy.

Between the poles of a forcibly subjectivist conception of art and a rigidly objectivist one lies plenty of room—room that has yet to be consistently explored.

Can we still look to Kant, Hegel and Adorno for answers?

Kant, one of the most influential thinkers on aesthetics, ruled out the possibility of determining the beauty of a work of art rationally through concepts or rules, although, according to Georg Simmel, Königsberg had never afforded him the sight of a great work of art. One might object that the “all-destroyer” of Königsberg is said to have read Rousseau’s Émile with enthusiasm, and surely the odd Greek tragedy as well. Kant’s aesthetics, however, is strongly visual in orientation. He preferred natural beauty—an unusual preference for a philosopher. Schopenhauer dismissed the Critique of Judgment as the product of Kant’s waning powers in old age and reproached him for beginning with abstract aesthetic judgment rather than aesthetic experience.

Yet one reason for the success of Kant’s aesthetics may be that, with his third Critique, he managed to square the circle: he preserved the subjectivity of the aesthetic—that is, the dogma of privacy at the heart of the modern bourgeois religion of art—without excluding aesthetics from philosophy’s objective standards. Kant’s system is not necessarily subjectivist, but rather blends subjective and objective elements in not always consistent fashion, much to the continuing delight of his admirers (and critics). He dressed the bourgeois taste of his era in transcendental architecture. The baroque mania for system-building in Kant’s aesthetics has successfully immunized it against criticism, even though the system quickly begins to wobble as soon as one questions its vulnerable point: the absence of criteria for beauty.

One reason for the success of Kant’s aesthetics may be that he managed to preserve the subjectivity of the aesthetic without excluding aesthetics from philosophy’s objective standards.

For Kant’s antipode, Hegel, Germany’s other great aesthetician, objective judgments about the content and value of art were perfectly possible. According to Hegel, the higher a work ranks, the more perfectly it gives sensuous, organically living form to the “Idea”—the freedom of spirit—in a manner appropriate to spirit’s particular stage of development. For him, classical art fulfilled this standard most purely. Although Hegel attached great importance to aesthetics in his lectures on the subject, his speculative, quasi-Platonic theory can hardly satisfy us today.

Adorno appropriated Hegel’s aesthetics of truth in a convoluted fashion and gave it a dialectical twist. A work of art is true when it most adequately embodies its time—not affirmatively, however, but by working through its contradictions and the inherent untruth of the social totality. The work is “true” when it does not conceal what is false in existing conditions, but makes that visible in its own form as rupture, dissonance, or non-identity.

Even such a complicated, negatively inflected aesthetics of truth can scarcely persuade a post-metaphysical age. This is not only because it rests on a metaphysical claim to truth and a speculative philosophy of history. It also has troubling implications, since it judges works of art by their “critical”, resistant—in other words, “correct”—attitude toward their own epoch, thereby tying aesthetic quality closely to ethical and political criteria.

Adorno’s complicated, negatively inflected aesthetics of truth can scarcely persuade a post-metaphysical age.

There are good reasons to regard Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory as the last great work of philosophical aesthetics. Yet it failed to rein in the art-worshipping verbiage of today’s all-powerful cultural ideology—and not merely because of its mannered, hypertrophic style, which its author mistook for aesthetic achievement and which makes reading the work an ordeal. But perhaps, in the end, that is how it must be: the time will come when man will no longer give birth to a star.

Still, a more profound understanding of art—in other words, objective knowledge—might offer effective resistance to its colonization by imperatives alien to art itself. Feeling alone is never enough. Art, as we know since Kurt Vonnegut, is the canary in the coal mine of culture. When it begins to sing out of tune, feebly or shrilly, this is an unmistakable sign that the political atmosphere is gradually turning toxic.